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Foreword 
This report was commissioned by the International Council for New Initiatives in 
East West Cooperation (the "Vienna Council"). The rapid economic transition in 
many East West european countries has brought into sharp focus the need to 
modernize services, methods, management and specialized skills as well as 
products and processes in the manufacturing sector. 
In spite of the recent expansion of economic cooperation between eastern and 
western enterprises the economic and technical importance of these joint ventures 
are of little strategic importance to real economic reform. They are mostly small 
low-investment and mostly in the low sophistication services sector. 
The relevance of the technology to be transferred is of obvious importance in 
any joint venture or cooperative business arrangement. However, the major 
reasons for slow progress is rooted in other factors, such as management skills, 
existence of services and maintenance infrastructure, availability of supplies, 
availability of transport and logistics, to name a few. 
It was to provide some background in these non-technological aspects of 
technological transfer that prompted this Working Paper. It is in that context 
that this Working Paper should be viewed. 
Dr. Robert H. Pry 
Director 
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EAST-WEST TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER: 
Basic Knowledge and Reflections 
Jaroslav Jira'sek and Rita Becker* 
The story of up-to-date technology transfer started in the 1960s in association with the post- 
war thaw in international affairs. Since 1965, and particularly in the early 1970s) East-West 
trade began expanding a t  a rapid rate. In the main, the policy of "d4tente7' has been credited 
with the improvement in East-West economic relations. This grew into a substantial subject of 
international interest in the 1980s. 
Present policy options have expanded considerably as a consequence of upheavals in East 
European affairs. Technology transfer and trade are not exempt from this far-reaching reap- 
praisal. The almost universal penetration of the "new thinking" in international policymaking, 
associated with considerations of other countries' interests and concerns for stable improve- 
ments in global security and prosperity, has endowed international technology transfer with a 
new creative potential. 
Since January 1989, all East European countries have adopted more liberal legal provisions 
that  allow technology transfer to  grow and be combined with a capital venture. Several former 
discrepancies between Western and Eastern approaches to  technology transfer were reduced, 
some disappearing completely. The interest in East-West economic cooperation increased on 
both sides. The future development of East-West technology transfer will be dissimilar to that  
achieved in the past. Shifting away from being an auxiliary and peripheral issue, technology 
transfer will move very much into the foreground. 
The number of agreements on East-West Industrial Cooperation (EWIC), e.g., interlinked 
and jointly operated research, manufacturing, sales, etc., is beginning to  multiply. For the 
time being, some 2,500 large-scale (intermediated or guided by state administration) industrial 
agreements and 3,200 joint ventures' are registered. The EWIC agreement, if put together, 
make up to some 6-8% of the whole East-West trade.2 However, technology transfer has not 
yet taken first priority in East- West economic cooperation. 
Definitions of Technology Transfer 
The definition of technology transfer (as opposed t o  mere machinery import/export issues), 
especially the question of how to  define advanced or high technology transfer (see Appendices 
1, 2, 3 and 4), is subject t o  gradual change. 
Definitions of technology transfer vary as the subject matter itself evolves, adjusting t o  
changing patterns in the international division of labor, and adopting new features. In the USA 
and within the framework of the OECD, the following definition (as was approved by the 95th 
Congress of the United States) is recognized as adequate: "A process whereby innovations (new 
products and know-how) obtained in one country are then transmitted for use to  another." 
Further explanation of this rather open definition reminds us that  it is "essentially a process 
'Research Centre, Jiilich, FRG. 
'Including the approximately 700 cases (1988) of "Polonian ventures, which are joint ventures of a specific 
nature funded by Polish entrepreneurs abroad. 
2The growth of the EWIC agreements is expected to follow increased East-West trade (albeit at a slower rate). 
Table 1: Exports from Developed Market Economies to East European Countries (in bio $): 
Year Total Machinery and Chemicals 
Transport Equipment 
1980 46.3 12.2 6.6 
1986 35.7 11.8 5.2 
Source: U N  Foreign Trade Statistical Yearbook 
of transmitting knowledge" and implies an "active role on the part of both transferrer and 
recipient ." 
While the terminology "East-West" reflects standard usage, in several cases it would be 
advisable to distinguish the prevailing direction as being either West-East or East-West and 
distinguish the OECD or CMEA membership of the transferring and receiving countries. 
Comments on the Available Reports 
Reports on technology transfer from different authors, sources, and time periods offer little that 
can be compared internationally. The data of a growing number of reports are derived from 
various statistical samples, countries, and years. Consecutive research and reporting over a 
longer time period is rare. 
This may be explained not by referring to a low statistical culture (which sometimes leaves 
much to be desired) but, predominantly by accepting the rapid shift of the political and eco- 
nomic interests, adjustment of priorities, change in the legal, administrative and socioeconomic 
provisions, rules or codes of conduct, etc. Theoretical reflections on changes that occurred over 
the past years, especially those after 1989 referring to the completely changed situation, are still 
on the desks of researchers, experts, or journalists. 
The foreseeable trend will prefer higher levels of international economic cooperation, such as 
joint R&D (R&E) agreements, coproduction (comanufacturing) arrangements and joint ventures 
(joint stock entrepreneurship). 
The Growing Volume of Technology Trade and Transfer 
The volume of trade with technology, mainly machinery and equipment, while constantly grow- 
ing, is still comparatively small. 
The framework for the East-West technology transfer could be measured against the total 
trade flows from developed countries to East European countries. These have not increased in 
past years (see Table 1): 
Science, technology and know-how have become an international trade commodity. They 
are a most important component of up-to-date manufacturing, its dynamic growth, productive 
power, and potential for satisfying new needs, and are a major factor in socioeconomic change. 
However, their ambiguous potential for civil and defense use constantly impedes international 
trade. In very many cases their transfer is judged as controversial, as it may lead to the unwanted 
establishment of a competitive adversary position. 
Another survey can be derived from the direct foreign trade between the OECD countries 
and the CMEA countries (see Table 2): 
A stagnant level of foreign trade does not open space for more intensive technology trade. 
On the other hand, the demand for technological leverage has been growing and, of course, the 
scope of technologically intensive trade has been increasing constantly. So far, however, the pace 
has not been remarkable. (See Table 3 and in particular, Appendices 5, 6, and 7.) 
While the current volume of technology transfer is far from what would be considered de- 
sirable, nevertheless, when well-selected, prepared, and carried out, it has proved to  have a 
Table 2: Western technology exports to the East (Volume 1970 = 100%). 
1975 1980 1983 
OECD capital goods 
exports to the East: 
- Eastern Europe 
- Soviet Union 
- Total 
OECD intermediate (technology) goods 
exports to the East: 
- Eastern Europe 
- Soviet Union 
- Total 208 257 230 
0
Table 3: OECD exports of highly R&D-intensive technology to  the East European countries (in 
percent). 
Country 1970 1980 1983 
Bulgaria 2.30 3.72 4.64 
CSR 3.63 3.35 4.21 
GDR 1.94 3.25 2.13 
Hungary 3.88 4.55 4.22 
Poland 2.48 1.83 3.26 
Romania 4.12 - - 
Subtotal 3.20 3.65 4.32 
Soviet Union 1.97 1.55 1.80 
Tot a1 2.67 2.58 2.73 
Source: OECD East-West technology transfer data base (summary of Western statistics). 
conspicuous impact on some companies or whole industrial branches. 
Another, still more rapid, increase is to be expected after 1989, when new legal and admin- 
istrative provisions liberalizing economic cooperation come into force. In the fall of 1989 and 
early 1990, most East European countries accomplished a political and socioeconomic change 
and are in the process of integrating on an all-European level. 
The "seven big" and other OECD countries offer a set of measures facilitating the extension 
of East-West trade relations (including technology transfer). Most favored nation clause, low 
interest credits, technical and other important expertize, management consulting and training, 
etc. 
New Impetus for Technology Transfer in the 1990s 
Since the 1970s and 1980s, paramount changes in methods of manufacturing seem t o  have divided 
European countries. 
In the West, dependence on the growth of production of raw material and energy supply was 
loosened during the 1970s. A new type of "mass and power" saving manufacturing gradually 
gained momentum. 
In the early 1980s, Western countries introduced examples of a new breed of "high tech- 
nologies" with a new economic, social and ecologic potential, such as "intelligent" automation, 
biotechnologies, highly effective materials, etc., all supported by informatics and digital telecom- 
munication. 
High technologies make i t  possible t o  increase production with an unproportionally lower 
increase of energy and raw materials. They are more environment-friendly and they also address 
the brain rather than the hands of the working man. Extensive use of high technologies may 
decelerate the present depletion of natural and human resources. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the technological gap enlarged t o  a critical extent. This fact was 
soon manifested in a stagnation of the industrial output and technology conservatism of all East 
European countries. 
The main cause of the decreasing gross output of East European economies is seen not 
primarily in labor productivity but in the obsolescence and inadequate performance of fixed 
capital (see Table 4). 
East European countries tried, under this technological pressure, t o  develop modern techno- 
logical programs. In the mid- 1980s, this was primarily "The comprehensive program of scientific 
and technological progress until 2000" adopted in the CMEA community. The program soon 
failed without persuasive r e ~ u l t s . ~  
3The initial formulation of the program did not concede to other regional prestigious programs and resembled 
mostly the core of the Eureka program. 
Table 4: Labor and capital productivity in the material sphere (1980-1983). Average annual 
percentage change. 
Productivity of Labor Productivity of Capital 
1960 1980 1983 1960 1980 1983 
Bulgaria 7.0 5.5 2.7 -2.5 -2.6 -3.0 
CSR 3.2 2.5 1.7 -2.3 -0.3 -2.4 
GDR 5.7 4.0 3.7 -1.3 -0.8 -0.8 
Hungary 5.1 0.9 1.8 -0.7 -6.9 -3.0 
Poland 5.1 -5.2 5.0 -0.2 -7.0 -2.0 (-3.0) 
Romania 7.3 2.0 2.8 -1.2 -5.7 -4.0 
USSR 4.8 3.2 3.5 0.0 -3.4 -2.6 
Source: Economic Survey of Europe, EEC, Geneva 1984 and 1986. 
The mid-1980s demonstrate a contradictory development. The commercial barriers are grad- 
ually being dismantled and a t  the same time, the East European countries are trying to  overcome 
the debit burden. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, and lately Romania, debt servicing 
exercises a prohibitive impact on imports. In spite of the many statements as to  the need for 
high technology, most East European countries have not substantially increased their imports 
in the high technology sector. In general, the share of the most sophisticated products does not 
exceed 5%. 
CoCom 
Multilateral controls imposed by the Coordinating Committee (CoCom) in Paris, whose mem- 
bers are all NATO member countries (except Iceland and Japan), 17 altogether, interferes with 
a liberal technology transfer. The definition of militarily "sensitiven or "dual-usen technologies 
has been revised several times, often, however, tightened. 
Only in very recent times have the  underlying debates on what enhances or threatens national 
or, in a broad sense, Western security, become more open to  recessions. The issue of technology 
provoking security concerns seem t o  lose a great deal of its previous inconsistency and dependence 
on political oscillations. Some East European countries were entitled to  imports of advanced 
technologies under the condition that  they would not pass them on to  the Soviet Union. Quite 
recently, the USSR was supplied with advanced computers in the form of a joint venture. 
However, CoCom still plays an authoritative role in the technology trade policy and options 
of technology transfer cannot be chosen without taking its decisions into serious consideration. 
The CoCom interference can be alleviated but, i t  would be premature t o  expect its nullification 
in the foreseeable future. 
Technology Contracting 
International trade, including technology transfer, is regulated by international agreements. A 
survey of the decade 1975-1985 proves that  most agreements on cooperation are concluded in 
the machine building and chemical sector (see Appendix 8). 
In the late 1980s, contracting could already make use of the adopted legislative and ad- 
ministrative alleviations, most of which came into full force after January 1989.4 Contracts 
on cooperation (in research, development, subcontracting) and coproduction (comanufacturing) 
have now been shifted more towards complex agreements combining traditional forms with the 
opportunities for capital venture (Appendix 9). 
It is too early t o  derive conclusions. The new legislation is available but most Western forms 
are hesitant t o  enter a business involvement which they consider a s  not transparent or still 
hazardous. 
East European countries are offering, as an aftermath of the political changes in 1989, an  
advanced legal protection of the foreign capital investments and new, more liberal, provisions 
for the retrieval and repatriation of profits. 
In the near future one may expect a boom in the joint entrepreneurship and transfer of 
sophisticated hardware, know-how, and management skills, after which the technology gap could 
close a t  a more rapid pace. 
Transfer Through Licensing 
The international transfer of technology can also be intermediated through licensing. Together 
with simple foreign aid, cooperation, coproduction agreements, and joint ventures, licensing 
'See the IIASA Executive Guide for East-West on Joint Ventures published January 1990. 
continues to maintain an important role in the process of new technology proliferation and 
diffusion. 
Western countries vigorously entered the license trade in the 1960s. Increased licensing 
accompanied the growth of the high technology sector of industry (see Table 5). 
Table 5: The share of world regions in the license trade (in percent). 
1975 1980 
Receipts Royal ties Receipts Royal ties 
accepted paid accepted paid 
World 100 100 100 100 
Capitalist countries 98 80 99.1 74 .1  
Developing countries - 14 0.5 20.9 
Socialist countries 2 6 0.4 5 
Source: P. Marer: East-West Technology Transfer. 1968-1980, Paris 1983, p.117; R. Rapacki: Handel, 
1987, no.8. 
With the extension of foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures, the license trade is supposed 
to  retreat as the transfer shifts to more direct opportunities. 
The number of licenses purchased by Eastern countries and the size of royalties paid is 
difficult to  reconstruct from the available figures. CMEA sources estimate royalties paid a t  
approximately 360 million US$ annually. (For the development of West-East licensing in general 
terms, see Appendix 12.)5 
Licensing agreements often involve further purchases of materials, tools, and machinery, the 
volume of which may far exceed the license trade-offs. Some indicators showing the intensity of 
patent applications and patent grants are given separately (see Appendix 10, 1 1). 
Joint Ventures as a Tool for Technology Transfer 
Since January 1989, liberalization of joint ventures has been legally adopted in most East Euro- 
pean countries. In the fall of the same year, approximately 3,200 joint ventures were registered 
in the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Vested capital amounts to almost 
5 billion US$ (of which slightly more than 40% is from the West). 
I t  was presumed that  joint ventures would be a powerful vehicle for technology transfer as 
the potential for transfer seems undeniable. This, however, has not yet been fully disclosed. 
Less than 10-15% of joint ventures are associated with a kind of substantial technology transfer. 
Enhanced technology applications are typical for Czechoslovak and Hungarian joint ventures. 
(This also applies t o  joint ventures in the GDR, albeit the country does not have any joint 
venture legislation and approves joint capital venture from case t o  case.)6 
There are opportunities t o  exploit joint ventures far more in order t o  promote the transfer 
of advanced products and methods of manufacturing. Elaboration of international strategies 
of joint ventures (including technology transfer) should be supported. Up t o  now, most joint 
ventures have been judged as a commercial transaction, insufficiently linked with problems of 
technological leverage. 
'Some research work indicates contradictory data. See a critical evaluation in J.C. Brada: Technology Transfer 
between the United States and Communist Countries, in: Research in International Business and Finance, JAI 
Press, Greenwich, 1981. 
'A newly prepared legislation is supposed to be subject to further amendements in association with the 
reunification of Germany. 
Technology Centers 
In several Utechnological parksn (areas of conglomerated research institutes, development and 
experimental facilities, and advanced manufacturing) regional or municipal authorities and civic 
initiatives have established Utechnological centersn in order t o  support technology transfer and 
implementation and t o  promote local entrepreneurialship. 
It is advisable t o  introduce similar institutions into East European countries in order t o  
facilitate technological initiative in general and technology transfer into medium size and small 
enterprises in particular.7 
Intellectual Property Protection and Technology Transfer 
Another factor expected t o  boost international technology transfer is the growing concern of 
countries to  protect intellectual property rights, i.e., patents and copyrights. As clones of patents 
or copyrights are being prosecuted more now than ever before, more countries are adopting iden- 
tical, internationally recognized provisions to  protect intellectual property rights. Technology 
transfer remains a legitimate way of distributing advanced technology (see Appendix 13,14). 
In a time of extensive informatics and telecommunication, copyright protection in particular 
is becoming a subject of new concern. The Office of Technology Assessment of the US Congress 
tried t o  estimate losses by US firms due t o  copyright infringement (1984): the total amounted t o  
1330 million US$ of which two-thirds were in records, tapes, and software.' The figures are valid 
for ten developing countries of Asia and Africa only. Through extrapolation one may appraise 
the total losses of OECD countries somewhere around five billion US$ in 1984 and double that  
amount in 1988 (associated with an exponential growth of informatics in the meantime). The 
OECD countries have strengthened property laws and mechanisms of enforcement. 
East-East Technology Transfer 
The East-West (or West-East) directions of technology transfer are developing along the East- 
East (and West-West) technology exchange, based on different principles and rules. The intra- 
CMEA exchange of "science and technology" is not believed t o  considerably foster trade with 
high technology hardware and know-how. A new initiative (1988) to  develop the so-called "direct 
relationsn (i.e., advocating not governmentally intermediated but inter-enterprise direct agree- 
ments on joint research and development/experimenting, coproduction or joint capital ventures) 
which are regarded as particularly fruitful for technology transfer among CMEA member coun- 
tries, brought into existence some 1500 such agreements as of January 1, 1989. However, as a 
whole, they do not exceed 1% of the mutual trade of either respective country.9 
Eastern Technology Transfer to the West 
There has always been a certain small amount of technology transfer from East t o  West, mostly 
in the form of successful research results or inventions. However, completely new dimensions 
of technology transfer from the East were opened when the Soviet Union offered a number of 
military research results for civil implementation in the West and other East European countries 
followed. 
7Certain positively conclusive experiences were made in the USSR, such as the %cientific townn of Novosibirsk 
or in the qualified %cientific parkn of Zelenogorsk. 
'OTA, Intellectual property rights in an Age of Electronics and Information, Washington, D.C., 1986. 
'After political upheavals in East European countries, many of these agreements are believed to have been 
subject to cancellation. 
This type of industrial LLspin-off" was limited in the past t o  national boundaries or countries 
of the same military blocks. In some countries, this opportunity has been well accepted and is 
practically applied, for instance in the FRG, Finland, Italy, and others. 
Countertrade 
Since the mid-1970s the growth of countertrade practices has attracted the attention of observers 
of the East-West trade. Due t o  the steep increase in foreign debts in most East European 
countries, trade compensation has been gradually identified with countertrade operations in 
general and with short-term buy-back (counterpurchase) arrangements in particular. These 
countertrade practices were so extensive that  a variety of trade contingencies were developed, 
such as occasional one-time deals between firms; long-term arrangements of counter-deliveries 
between firms; turn-key contracts of deliveries of complete industrial plants t o  be compensated 
by later deliveries of the plant(s) products; industrial cooperation and coproduction; multi-firm 
or long-term compensation agreements between the governments, etc. 
In the 1970s, the proportion of countertrade was estimated a t  some 10-20%. Since then the 
share has grown to  approximately 40-60%. In his analysis of countertrade practices, the OECD 
Secretariat emphasized that  certain disadvantages of countertrade are generally understated. 
(See Table 6.) 
The growing debt burden in most East European countries has led t o  one-sided measures for 
preserving a commodity trade balance. These countries tend t o  look a t  industrial compensation 
as a sempiternal way in which t o  conduct their foreign trade, thus postponing and impeding 
actions toward their currency convertibility. Many Western firms also complain of the impact 
on the size and length of trade contracts under countertrade rule. 
Table 6: Countertrade trends. 
Country Volume of Western exports contracted 
of imports under a countertrade arrangement 
(Is mio) 
1969-75 1976-80 Total 
Bulgaria 99 10 109 
Czechoslovakia 103 160 263 
GDR 178 3523 3601 
Hungary 186 453 639 
Poland 3482 1895 5377 
USSR 7388 12418 19806 
Source: Countertrade, OECD Publications, 1981, Table 1. 
Remarks: 
1. Only the 290 agreements which the OECD Secretariat was able to identify are included. The trends 
alone may be taken for granted. 
2. In the case of Poland the increase of the "Polonia" ventures is responsible for the rapid growth of 
countertrade, whereas in the GDR, it is the inner trade (Binnenhandel) which will be taken mostly 
into consideration. 
3. In some countries the counter-deliveries were specifically associated with certain industries. In the 
USSR, fuel exceeds 60% of the total compensation. Chemicals and heavy machinery in the GDR 
and Poland and consumer goods in Hungary, represent approximately half the compensation. 
Changes in Information and Proliferation Nexuses 
The usual consensus is that  the growth potential of technology transfer depends on the knowledge 
available and on its utilization. Information is the most pervasive tool with which to  generate 
an awareness of the technological gap and improve technological planning. 
Technology as a commodity is traded in many diverse forms, such as capital or consumer 
goods (technological hardware), technological information (software), technological and related 
services. According to  the diversity of technology trade, information options are also distributed 
via journals, articles and books, circular letters, patent documents, analytical studies, consul- 
tancy, teaching and trading. Very much depends on mutual acquaintance, confidence and credi- 
bility. Technological trade is signified by a high complexity of matters and requires a great deal 
of professionalism and negotiation capabilities. 
The protagonists of technology transfer used to  be: specialized firms for technology trade; 
scientifically based or technologically advanced hi-tech firms; universities and research institutes; 
engineering firms; chambers of industry and/or commerce; technical departments of state bodies 
(administration, police, army) and local administration. 
New institutions of technology diffusion have come into existence and are growing in im- 
portance and size. Included are: technology data  (information) bases; branch-bound or local 
technology centers; "born-in," "spin-off" or "multiplication" engineering services; advanced tech- 
nology training centers (able t o  continue with a professional consultancy). 
In previous years some civic initiatives were also concerned with technology information 
and distribution, for instance associations and clubs for technology enlightenment and guid- 
ance; youth associations for scientific and technological activities; many exhibitions with wider 
programs, etc. 
Technology is a factor of major socioeconomic change. Differences in technology devolve into 
business, social, cultural or environmental values. No country can afford t o  leave technology 
advancement to  the engineering community alone. 
Industrial Dimensions 
The dimensions of the technology transfer are distributed in an uneven way. Some industries 
are not yet quite covered by the technology transfer achieved in traditional industries, which 
need considerable modernization, i.e., coal, oil, power generation, and steel industries. 
Technology transfer is most welcome in hi-technologies such as new materials, alternative en- 
ergy resources, industrial automation, robotics, computers, telecommunication, biotechnologies, 
ecotechnologies, etc. 
Prior to  the 1970s, the majority of high tech transfer applied to  the machine building in- 
dustry: mechanical, electrotechnical (including electronics) and transport. No item, however, 
exceeded 5% of the total export mark. Usually the intensity and dimensions of the technol- 
ogy transfer are associated with political stability, economic potential and policy making of the 
countries. After 1989, a turnover year which cannot yet be interpreted in statistical terms, 
the Eastern countries are credited with much more favorable conditions and predictability of 
technical, political and economic interlinks. 
Toward a Comprehensive International Strategy of Technologi- 
cal Transfer 
The majority of the technology transfer tends to be limited in size and have a short-term im- 
pact. However, where the technology transfer is converted into a permanent manufacturing 
cooperation, coproduction or joint venture, the initial impact may be "snowballed" a t  an ac- 
celerated pace. The impact of the technology transfer depends on several preconditions, such 
as political stability, economic benefits, managerial potential, culture, skills of the workforce 
and others. There are many examples showing that multi-factoral analysis and decision-making 
may provide different results depending on the systems approach and long-range vision of the 
technology transfer. Obviously, technology transfer has attained the threshold of an urgently 
needed internationally well-balanced and carefully elaborated long-range strategy. It should be 
promoted among the priority issues of the new internationalism of our times. 
Recommendations From Some Conclusive Studies 
Many studies on technology transfer are already available (see Bibliography in the Appendix). 
A new recognition should be attributed to  the studies undor the auspices of the OECD and EC. 
Several studies have been accomplished by research institutions with a wide international field 
of activities. Studies carried out within the framework of the CMEA are lesser known1° but are 
credited with revealing some findings different t o  those in the West. 
Based on the active OECD contribution, some conclusive knowledge can be summarized. 
Econometric case studies under the sponsorship of the OECD highlighted, in general terms, the 
fact that  West-East technology transfer has made a significant contribution t o  the technological 
advancement of some companies and whole industries. At the same time, the studies carried 
out revealed several inhibiting factors, among them being: 
the transfer presumes good professional preparatory measures in advance; 
advanced technology is to  be transferred with the professional know-how with which it 
is associated (in the case of computer technology this could be expressed in terms of a 
complementarity of hardware and software); 
the recipient country is t o  develop an adequate infrastructural environment; 
careful attention should be paid to  the differences in the economic, social, cultural, envi- 
ronmental position, regulation and value orientation. 
The OECD studies reveal some generic impeding factors causing a low economic efficient of 
technology transfer in East European countries. Many of them can be confirmed not only as 
research findings but widely admitted in the official reports of their respective countries, such 
as : 
a different set of values t o  define the "success" of the transfer (market vs. non-market 
evaluation) including a lower interest in innovations among the top-management; 
underdeveloped consulting and engineering services, commercial banks, insurance institu- 
tions; 
deficiencies in tool, material supply, transport and communication; shortage of flexible 
subcontractors; 
low level of CAD/CAM implementation; 
lower plant or factory performance, quality and cost standards, less self-reliance on auxil- 
iary tasks such as setting the machinery, material handling, storage, planning and control, 
etc.; 
lower propensity of managers and engineering personnel t o  take responsibility and make 
use of cost-benefit analysis (economically sound decisions); 
''East-west Technology Transfer, OECD, Paris 1984. 
r excessive time required for decision-making by governmental or other administrative au- 
thorities, 
r lack of "venturen capital ("venture" banks). 
The still modest contribution of East European studies, while confirming many of the OECD 
research results, presents some dissenting critical statements: 
r technology transfer from the West is often some five years obsolete; 
r in several cases the transfer is incomplete (sometimes in order to  involve further deliveries) 
inducing another kind of dependence (on supplied tools, material, maintenance, etc.); 
r the transferring firms do not pay enough attention to  the  difference in socio-economic 
environments, to  the need for instruction and training, technical consulting and assistance; 
most receiving countries would welcome a countertrade arrangement, however, very few 
trading companies are in a position to  negotiate. 
In other words, as the complaints indicate, the technology transfer is not understood from the 
point of view of closing the technological gap and developing a broad market with an advanced 
network of supplier and clients, but still extensively from the exclusive point of view of a business 
case and commercial rewards. 
Appendix 1 
Tvpe of Contrrhrnl Armngements lncluded in Different Dennilions 
of East-West Industrial (Inter firm) Conperation@ 
Sale of equipment for complete production systcms. or "turnkey" plant sales (usually including 
technical assistance). 
Licensing of patents, copyrights and production know-how. 
Franchising of trademarks and marketing know-how. 
Licensing or franchising with provision for niarkct sharing and quality control. 
Co-operativcsourcing: long-term agreement for purchasaand sales between partners. especially in 
the form of exchanges of industrial raw materials and intermediate products. 
Subcontracting: contractual agreement for provision of production services, for a short-tern1 and 
on the basisofcxistingcapabilitia. but onen to design specifications furnished by the contractor. 
Some or all components also frequently supplied by contractor. 
Sale of plant. equipment and/or technology (1-3 above) with provision for complete or partial 
payment in resulting or related products. 
Reduction contracting: contractual agreement for production on a continuing basis, to partncr 
spccifications,ofintermediatc or final BOO& to be incorporated into the partncr's product or to be 
marketed by him. In contrast tosub-contracting. productioncontracting usually ison the hasisof 
a partially tnnsferrcd production capability. in the form ofcapital equipment andlor technology 
(on basis of a license or technical assistance contract). 
Co-production : mutual agreement to narrow specialization and exchange components so that cach 
partner may produce and markct the same end product in his respective market area. Usually on 
the basis of some shared technology. 
Roduct specialization: mutual agreement to narrow the range ofcnd products produced by each 
partncr and then to exchange them so that cach commands a full line in his rcspectivc market 
arca. In contrast to co-operative sourcing. produa specialization involves adjustment in existing 
produa lines. 
Co-marketing: agreement to divide markct areas for some product(s) and/or to assume raponsi- 
bilitia for marketing and servicing each other's product(s) in respective areas. Joint marketing in 
third markets may be included. Does not in practice stand alone. unless in the form of a p in t  
marketing company ( i t . .  combined with 14 helow). Othcnvise combined with various rorms. 
especially 4. 8. 9. 10. 
Roject co-peration: joint tendering for development projects in third countria.  
Joint Research and Development : joint planning. and the coordinated implcmentalton. of  R & D 
programs, with provision for joint commercial righ~s to all product or process technology 
developed under the agreement. 
Any oftheabove in the framework o fa  specially formed mixed company or joint venture between 
the partncr firms (on the basis of joint equity participation. profit and risk sharing. p in t  
management). 
a) Thc urmimbly  uud hm is M cu&rd d thc IF arn variously dnimtd ~n thc Itanturn. Far cumplc. thc t m n  
" ~ h d U r i f u -  u Y m n i m a  wad l o d s ~ c  JI or m d t y w  I thmugh 10 F a  more catmuvc M ~ n ~ l l m .  & s c u m  a d  
illwrua d l h c  m v l v  Imdrmnrmenc incluW In this I*. but usin  lo-kt d ~ k r r n l  ~rrminolav. the ~ n t n u d  rsdcr is 
FAI Commnrr. Hdh-Lraillgon. Lra~llgon. M a . .  1974 
&urrr:Carl H McMt1I.n. "E..(.Wol Inhnrul C m r ~ o n "  tn &$I Eun~pren Er.,numrr~ hvcr I l r h ~ n k ~ .  rrr. p 1112 
Appendix 2 
Calepries of East-\Vest Industrial Cooperation and their Definition: 
a Comparison of Schema used by Paul hlarer and Joseph C. hlllltr and by the l ' n i t d  Nations 
Catqory and Dcfinnlion Uxd ECE DcRnlthon 
I .  Scientific-technical agreement (STA) are signed between a US Category not included. 
corporation and the Soviet State Committee for Science and 
Technology (or its counterpart in an EE country) to explorc what 
technology or know-how might be exchanged subsequently, on a 
conlmercial basis. While STAs are not commercial contracts, they 
a n  of intemt becaw ihey identify industries and projects where 
the Eastern partner intends to obtain Western technology and 
where US firms have both an interest and a capability to 
compete. 
2 .  Know-how (K) is transfemd under a technical assistance contract. Category not included. 
Only if such a contract was signed on its oum, rather than as a 
component ofa license or equipment saleor more complex formsot 
IC, was it included as a separate catcgory.a 
3. Licensing (L), regardless of the means of payment. L is not shown Licensing (L) with pay- 
separately ifit occurred as part o l a  morc complex transaction. such ment in resultant pm- 
as turnkey, co-production or joint venture, to avoid double- ducts. 
counting the number of agreements or projects. "L-direct" records 
transactions by a US-based firm directly: "L-indirect" records 
transactions carried out by a European. Canadian, or Japanese 
subsidiary or alli1iate.h 
4. Turnkey (TK) includes all contracts where the supplier has Turnkey (supply of com- 
significant on-site installation or supervision responsibilities. plete plants or production 
namely: prime contractor; contractor (US lirm is one of several lines) with payment in 
contracton but agreement is d imt ly  with the host country); and resultant products (Sub- 
subcontractor (supplies machinery and equipment under subcon- contractors are not In- 
tract and has on-site installation/training mponsibilities. cluded). 
5 .  Subcontracting (SC) in the Eastern country. with the Western Same. 
partner usually providing the technical know-how and sometimes 
the machinery. equipment. and pans. 
6. Co-production (CP) each partner specializes either in the produc- Same. 
tion ofpartsofa product assembled by oneor both partnenor in the 
production of a limited number of finished products exchanged to 
complete each partner's range of products. 
7. Joint ventures (JV) co-ownenhip of capital. co-managemen:. and Same, plus including joint 
sharingof risk and profit. if the N is located on the territory of the marketing ventures typi- 
Eastern partner. cally located in the West 
which market products of 
the Eastern country. 
R Category not included (no known US cases). Joint Tendering or Pro- 
jects (JTP) supply of com- 
plete plants or production 
lines to a third Western 
party. 
9 .  Reverse Licensing (RL): US firms is importing a license. This Category not included. 
ategory is nac part of the total. 
a) I t  13 w l u l  ~ o d u l ~ m l s h  know-hon ( l ) lo  nukc (2 ) toopr*c  and nulnlun and (1) to.pply W k u s  a I l rmx and a w l m l  
nnnrully m m  r h t  mn bc put oo paper. krarr-how 13 hr rradlly mdnrd on pper. nlhcr 11 rnuu bc d m m v n t d  
A) Thlr study upnccly I-rl wlh pymenl In -h. In 6ulu111 podur(. ard p a m l  no( rgchfad 
Swrrr h u t  M J ~ .  kvph C Milk. "US h n r l p t m  In €AS-Wa lnduarvl C v t m  -mu''  In Journal 4 
Inmnarrmal lucrnrr~ Stdm Fall-W~ntn. 1977, pp 21-29 
Appendix 3 
Raruch In~mr~vc Rodw Gmup r l rh~n  the Raarrh lntmr~vc lndusna 
Sourrr Gaps rn T a h n d ~  -Amhrrcal Rrpan OECD. Rnr. 1970. Book UI. Appcnd~a 2. pp 231-232 
50 R m h  Imensive Product Croups ( 1 9 7 0 )  
m c  
I& Raducl Gmup 
07 1.3 Coffee essences. extracts 
122.2 Cigarettes 
23 1.2 Synthetic rubber 
43 1.2 Hydrogenated oils, h t  
5 1 2.86 Sulphonamides 
5 13.2 Chemical elements n.e.s. 
5 13.5 Metallic oxide for paint 
5 15.1 Radio-active elements 
53 1 .O1 Synthetic organic dye 
533.3 Prepared paints. enamels. 
lacqum, etc. 
54 1.63 Sera, vaccines 
54 1.3 Antibiotics 
599.75 Anti-knock preparations 
55 1.2 Synthetic perfume and flavour 
materials 
57 1.1 h p a d  explosives 
58 1.3 1 Vulcanized fibres 
629.4 Rubber belting 
655.5 Elastic fabrics and trimmings 
of elastic 
675.03 Alloy steel. hoop and strip 
678.2 Tubes and pipes of iron and steel. 
seamless 
69 1.2 Finished structural parts and 
structum of aluminium 
695.24 Tools for use in hand or mach~ne 
695.26 Carbide tool tips. etc. 
698.1 1 Locks and keys 
86 1.1 Optical elements 
86 1.5 Cinema cameras 
srrc 
lndct Rpdu.3 Gmup 
861.7 Medical i m r - m e n t s  
86 1.9 Measuring and controlling. 
ocientific insrruments 
862.4 Photo film 
89 1.1 Sound rccordm 
899.97 Vacuum flasks 
266.3 Regenerated fibre to spin 
7 1 1.3 Steam engines. turbines 
7 1 1.81 Water engines and turbincs 
7 14.2 Calculating and accounting 
machines 
7 1 5.1 Metal cutting tools 
7 15.23 Welding machinery 
7 18.22 Type setting machinery 
718.3 Food processing mach~nes 
718.5 Mineral crushing etc.. and glass 
working machines 
7 19.15 Rehgerating equ~pment. 
non-domestic 
7 19.32 Fork lifl trucks 
Packaging and filling machines 
7 19.62 Ball. roller beanngs 
7 19.7 Telecommunicat~ons equipments 
n.e.s. 
* 7 2 4 . 9  X-ray apparatus 
736.2 Batteries and cells 
729.1 1 Trans~ston. valves, etc. 
729.3 E l m n c  measuring and control 
729.5 equipment 
* 7 32 . 4  Special motor vehicles 
Appendix 4 
High Technobgy 
* )  Some i t e m s  which might  w e l l  c o n t a i n  h i g h  t e c h n o l o g y  p r o d u c t s  
have n o t  been  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h i s  l i s t :  
SITC 
h ~ d m a  G ~ U P  of MCU 
Iubbrrdinl 
71 142 Jet and gas turbines for aircraft 
71 17 Nuclear reactors 
7142 Calculating machines (including 
electronic computers) 
7143 Statistical machina (punch card 
or tape) 
71492 Parts of ofice machinery 
(including computer parts) 
7 15 1 Machine tools for metal 
71 852 Glass-working machinery 
7192 Pumps and centrifuges 
71952 Machine tools for wood, 
plastic, etc. 
7 1954 Pans and accessories 
for machine tools 
71992 Cocks, valves. etc. 
7249 Telecommunications equipment 
(excluding TV and radio 
me iven)  
71 1 1 Steam%enerating boilers 
7 1 18 1 Water turbines 
7 1822 Type making and setting machi- 
ncry 
7 1994 Metal-plastic joints (gaskets) 
726 Electromcdical and X-ray 
a p p r a t  us 
I 
SITC 
kdlr# 01 GWP or ~ m ~ r r l  
Pubhedlrl 
7291 1 Primary batteries and cells 
7293 Tubes, transistors, photocells. etc. 
72952 Electrical muwring and 
control instruments 
7297 Electron and proton accelerators 
7299 Electrical machincry. n.e.s. 
(including electromagnets. 
traflic control equipment. 
signalling apparatus. etc.) 
734 1 Aircraft, heavier than air 
73492 Arcraft pam 
735 1 Warships 
73592 Specla1 purpox versels 
(including submersible vessels) 
86 1 1 Optical elements 
86 13 Optical instruments 
86161 Image projecton 
86 19 Measuring and control instru- 
ments. n.e.s. * )  
86 14 Photographic cameras 
8624 Photogaphic plates. film, a c .  
8641 Watches 
8642 Clocks 
* * )  The d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  High Tech s e c t o r  ist c o n s t a n t l y  chang ing .  
F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n  t h e  second  h a l f  o f  t h e  1980s among p rominen t  i t e m s  
new m a t e r i a l s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  o p t i c s ,  b i o t e c h n o l o g y ,  e t c .  a r e  t o  be  found.  
Appendix 5 
Comparison of high technology exports w i th  to ta l  exports  of fifteen I.W. coun- 
tries t o  t h e  world* a n d  t o  t h e  Eas te rn  Countries in 1972 a n d  1977. 
(in millions of US dollars) 
USSR 
Eastern Europe 
Yugoslavia 
Cuba 
China 
Total Social.Countries 
Total - World 
Tot a1 
1972 
High Tech 
582 
619 
270 
27 
64 
1562 
29092 
Total High Tech % 
* I.W. Countries: USA, Canada, Japan, Belgium-Luxembourg, France, F.RGermany, Italy, Netherlandr, 
Aurtria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., Denmark. Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, CSSR, German 
Dem.Rep., Hungary, Poland, Rumania, USSR. 
Source: John P .  Young: Quantification of Western Exportr of High Technology Productr to the Commun- 
ist Countries, op. cit. p. 10. 
Appendix 6 
Top five high technology I.W. exports 
to t h e  Eas te rn  countries in 1977. 
1977 
SITC Value % of total % of total ($ Millions) High Tech exports exports 
7151 Machine tools for working metal 1257 25.7 3.7 
7192 Pumps and centrifuges 775 15.9 2.3 
7299 Electrical machinery 
and apparatus, n.e.s. 560 11.5 1.6 
71992 Taps, cocks, valves, n.e.8. 495 10.1 1.4 
72952 Electrical meauring and 
controlling instruments, n.e.s. 307 6.3 0.9 
Top Five Total 3394 69.5 9.9 
Source: John P. Young, Quantification of Wertern Exportr of High Technology Productr to the Communirt 
Countrier, op. cit. p. 12 and 2nd draft 1979, p. 12. 
Appendix 7 
Commodity Composition by Factor Inlensit). of Western Exports mnd lmpons 
from Eruern Europe and the Soviet Union 
Eastern Europe and USSR 
1965-I%Y 
1973-1977 
o/ wh~ch: 1976 1977 
Total exports and irnpor~s = 100 
Soviet Union 
1965-1969 
1973- 1977 
o/ which: 1976 1977 
Eartern Europe and USSR Total 
IW5-1%9 39 -93 
1973-1977 5 %7 1 092 
o/ which: 1976 1977 6 879 814 
Tcrhnologclllv 
. d v u l d  poduls 
b p  Imp 
Soviet Union 
1%5-1%9 -315 -198 
1973- 1977 2 237 200 
o/ wh~ch: 1976 1977 2 938 2s I 
In pr icnl 
Nalura r w r c c  
nntmrarc produclr 
fip. Imp 
Capla-tnlcm~rc 
producls 
Exp Imp. 
Sot,rrv Lr ,,nornr< Brtllrrrn kor Ftdrop Vol 10 Ho I prc-puhlbcal~on Icnl. Table 0 8 T hc Iayaul oflhls lablc h s  k n  rcarnny\ l  lo 
conform rnlh Ihal 01 Tablt I Thc dcfinolton of the troup, IS n a  Ihc u m t  In lhc I r o  lablo Thc kfinnllonr for Ihls lab* are as 
follo-r 
Wr -nn~ rns l r c  
prmucls 
f i p  Imp 
Appendix 8: Industries' share in the total number of industrial cooperation contracts, by country. 
(in percent) 
Chemicab Metal- Transport Machine Mechanical Country Total Elec- Electrical Food and Light Total Total Other industry lurgy equipment tools engineering tronics equipment agriculture industry 
* 
branches 
'36 2 3 4 5 6 5+6 7 8 7+8 1 9 1 +9 10 
'd 
Total 
B 
1976 100 23.8 7.9 12.6 3.5 22.0 25.5 7.5 6.0 13.5 5.2 6.5 11.7 5.0 
1984 100 22.5 6.5 11.3 5.5 14.4 19.9 7.4 8.3 15.7 6.8 10.8 17.6 6.5 
E 
06 
Bulgaria 
1976 100 25.0 5.7 14.3 2.9 28.5 31.4 2.9 5.7 8.6 17.3 -- 17.1 2.0 
1984 100 9.1 4.5 6.8 4.5 25.0 29.5 11.4 6.8 18.2 9.1 20.4 29.5 2.3 
CSSR 
1976 100 22.7 -- 22.7 9.1 36.4 45.5 -- 9.1 9.1 -- -- -- -- 
1984 100 8.7 -- 11.6 16.0 21.7 37.7 2.9 14.5 17.4 10.1 11.6 21.7 2.9 
GDR 
1976 100 23.5 23.5 6.0 17.6 17.6 35.2 -- 5.9 5.9 5.9 -- 5.9 -- 
1984 100 15.1 6.1 27.3 9.1 18.2 27.3 9.1 -- 9.1 3.0 9.1 12.1 3.0 
Hungary 
1976 100 17.5 3.6 13.3 4.8 20.5 25.3 7.2 10.8 18.0 4.2 12.1 16.3 6.0 
1984 100 18.2 3.1 8.6 4.8 11.7 16.5 7.6 14.1 21.7 8.9 15.8 24.7 7.2 
Poland 
1976 100 23.4 11.3 10.5 4.8 23.4 28.3 9.0 5.6 14.6 1.6 4 .O 5.6 6.4 
1984 100 17.7 12.5 15.6 2.1 18.7 20.8 12.5 5.2 17.7 4.2 6.2 10.4 5.2 
Rumania 
1976 100 20.5 7.1 22.5 -- 30.6 30.6 6.1 2 .O 8.1 4.1 3.0 7.1 4.1 
1984 100 34.2 10.5 34.2 -- -- -- 5.3 2.6 7.9 2.6 5.3 7.9 5.3 
USSR 
1976 100 12.1 9.7 7.7 1.5 15.8 17.3 9.7 3.6 13.3 7.2 7.6 14.8 5.1 
1984 100 35.0 9.9 7.8 5.3 13.6 18.9 5.8 3.3 9.1 4.9 5.8 10.7 8.6 
LEGEND: 
1. Food and agriculture industry (including beveraeges) 
2. Chemicab industry (including pharmaceuticab) 
3. Metallurgy (including mining) 
4. Transport equlpment: lncludea aircraft, automobiles, lorries, tractom (even for agriculture), rolling stock, earth-moving equipment, diesel engines (even statlonary) 
5. Machine toob  
6. Mechanical engineering (all other non-electrical engineering) 
7. Electronis (computem and other office equipment, radio and television sets, communication equipment) 
8. Electrical equipment (all other equipment including electric locomotives and household appliances) 
9. Light industry (textiles, footwear, rubber, glass, furniture, consumer goods) 
lO.Other, such aa construction, hotel management, tourism, etc. 
Source: Promotion of Trade Through Industrial Cooperatlon, Statistical Outline of Recent Trends in Industrial Cooperation, 1976: TRADE/R355, 1984: TRADEIR.487.k 
Appendix 9 
Cooperation of CMEA countries with capitalist 
countries according to the form of it. 
(in percent) 
License agreements 28.2 26.1 17.1 15.0 15.6 13.6 13.6 12.1 
Deliveries of 
manufacturing plants 11.9 21.7 20.5 20.0 19.9 19.6 17.8 15.2 
Cooperation with 
industrialmachineparts 30.2 33.3 38.3 39.1 38.5 41.7 43.6 41.2 
Subcontracting 7.9 6.8 7.4 3.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 3.0 
Joint Ventures -- 2.9 10.5 13.1 12.6 12.7 12.3 17.0 
Tripartite cooperation - 9.1 6.3 9.5 10.7 10.3 10.3 11.4 
Total: 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Strany SEW, Moscow 1982, p. 195 and 1986, p. 199. 
PATENTS (in units) 
Applications Grants In force 
Country 1975 1981 1982 1983 1975 1981 1982 1983 1975 1981 1982 1983 
Austria 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
German Dem.Rep. 
Germany ,Fed.Rep. 
Hungary 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Sweden 
USSR 
USA 
Source: World Intellectual Property Organisation, Geneva. 
TRADEMARKS (in units) 
Applications for registrations Registrations granted Registrations in force 
Country 1975 1981 1982 1983 1975 1981 1982 1983 1975 1981 1982 1983 
Austria 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
German Dem.Rep. 
h) 
C Germany ,Fed.Rep. 
Hungary 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Sweden 
USSR 
USA 
- 
Source: World Intellectual Property Organi~ation, Geneva. 
Appendix 12 
PATENTS GRANTED TO EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES BY 
INDUSTRIAL WEST. 1970-1902 
Source: H. Wienert, J .  Slater: Eaat-Weat Technology Transfer, The Trade and Economic h p w t s ,  OECD, 
Paris, 1986, p. 124 
Appendix 13 
Receipts for  licenses. 
(in millions of US dollar prices from 1970) 
Country 1960 1970 1980 1984 
Austria 
CSSR 
FRG 
Finland 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherland 
Norway 
Sweden 
U.K. 
USA 
Royalties for  licenses. 
(in millions of US dollar prices from 1970) 
Country 1960 1970 1980 1984 
Austria 
CSSR 
FRG 
Finland 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherland 
Norway 
Sweden 
U.K. 
USA 
T r a d e  balance in licensing. 
(in millions of US dollar prices from 1970) 
Country 1960 1970 1980 1984 
Austria --- -25 -1 16 -78 
CSSR --- -19 -14 -14 
FRG -88 -225 -833 -564 
Finland --- -- -85 -98 
France -43 -153 -532 -457 
Italy -27 -258 -414 -697 
Japan -13 -374 -977 -1589 
Netherland --- -14 -225 -258 
Norway -- -5 -50 
Sweden --- -29 -133 -154 
U.K. --- +25 +276 +299 
USA +575 + 1978 +6208 +7605 
Source: Review of Economic Development in Abroad 1988; Center for Scientific, Technical and Economic 
Information, Prague 1988 
Appendix 14 
Import of licenses in three socialist countries. 
1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1971-1985 
CSSR 
Number of licenses 185 291 239 715 
Royalties for licenses in K b  1406.9 1664.3 1403.8 4475.0 
Poland 
Number of licenses 316 136 6 458 
Share of capitalist countries in % 90.5 94.1 66.6 91.0 
Royalties for licenses in zl 435.0 938.0 7100.0 - 
Hungary 
Royalties for licenses in Ft 424.2 3224.1 6400.3 - 
Share of capitalist countries in % 91 .O 93.3 93.8 93.5 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the countries referred to. 
Appendix 15: A Bibliography 
The following bibliography on technology transfer is divided into four groups: general literature, 
literature on East-West relations, literature by country, and by industry. May it be noted that 
the current state of knowledge about West-East technology transfer is characterized by 
a comparative abundance of articles and books; 
low accessibility of information from some countries, mainly from the Eastern ones; 
and very uneven professional standards." 
General Literature 
An International Code of Conduct on Technology Transfer. U.N.C.T.A.D., New York: U.N., 
1975, E.75.II.D.15, pp. 61. 
Information Systems and Networks for Technology Transfer, Final Report. Page, J.,  Szentivanyi, 
T., U.N.E.S.C.O. Paris, 1979, PGI-79/WS/2, pp. 311. 
Technology Assessment for International and National Technology Transfer. Maier. H.; in: 
IIASA/Laxenburg, Conference Papers CP-78-3, 1978, pp. 92. 
The Political Economy of International Technology Transfer. Proceedings, Conference Atlanta, 
April 1984, McIntyre, J.R., Papp, D.S. (ed.), Westport: Quorum, 1986, pp. 267. 
Transfer of Commercial Technology: Harmful or Helpful. Norris, W.C.; in: Common Sense in 
U.S.-Soviet Trade. Chapman, M., Marcy, C. (ed.), Washington: American Committee on 
East-West Accord, 1983, pp. 173. 
Transfer of Technology by Multinational Corporations, vol. 1. A Synthesis and Country Case 
Study. Germidis, D., OECD, Paris, 1977, pp. 309. 
Transfer of Technology by Multinational Corporations, vol. 2. A Background Papers, Germidis, 
D., OECD, Paris, 1977, pp. 238. 
Transfer of Technology for Small Industry. Proceedings/Seminar, Schloss Hernstein, July 1973, 
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Appendix 16: Case Studies 
F'urnel: A Polish Case Study 
The case study of Furnel International Limited provides us with insight into the motivation 
behind a joint venture partnership that  attempted on the one hand, to  achieve an important 
technology, and on the other, to  surmount the hurdles of the currency crunch and succeed in 
business. The name "Furnel" is an  acronym for "furniture" and 'electronics." In simplified 
terms, i t  is a joint venture that  exchanges Polish furniture for British electronic equipment. 
Furnel is by far the largest industrial joint venture in Poland. Established in 1986, it now 
employs some 4,500 people. It is credited with approximately 10% of the Polish furniture 
industry and accounts for some 75% of all Polish joint venture exports: five times as much as 
the next joint venture exporter. 
Furnel's British partner is International Computer Limited (ICL), which is a part of British 
Standard Telephones and Cables (BTC). Having been involved in the Polish market for more 
than 25 years, ICL had acquired extensive experience not only in product marketing and as- 
sembly with Polish manpower but also in various forms of countertrade. Thus they were able 
to  assess the benefits and risks of the joint venture and its possible role as a bridge for future 
market expansion. 
BTC-ICL contributed to  the joint business a 35% capital share amounting to  approximately 
2 mio$ However, as BTC-ICL's world-wide sales exceed 3 bio$, the risk involved with the Polish 
venture was very commensurate. 
On the Polish side, the foreign trade company PAGED, which specializes in furniture exports, 
formed a consortium of six firms involved in wood processing and furniture manufacturing. The 
Polish group represented a vertical integration with 80% self-sufficiency from raw materials to  
final products. This is an advantage in Poland, where supply disruptions are a chronic problem. 
Two electronic firms, Mera and Metronex, were also members of the Polish group and ac- 
counted for 16% of the invested capital, mainly as an in-kind contribution. Mera is expanding 
on the Polish market and Metronex is its foreign trade partner. 
The Polish wood and furniture industry is recognized for its design and has proved compet- 
itive on several markets. However, the Polish producers were aware of desirable improvements 
in manufacturing methods and quality guarantees. An evaluation of the products revealed that  
a comparatively small capital investment into manufacturing modernization could elevate the 
products to a world standard level. 
The Polish partner group brought in 49% of the statutory capital, mainly in-kind, i.e., 
buildings and equipment. The British partner was relied on as a source of hard currency for 
technological modernization. 
The main problem to be circumvented by the joint venture was the convertibility bias. The 
Polish zloty was not only nonconvertible but, a t  the same time, burdened with inflation. A 
countertrade arrangement seemed to  be the only feasible interlink; i t  proved effective. 
ICL could now enjoy a competitive edge over its computer trading rivals by selling to  the 
Polish market for zloty instead of hard currency and could provide software and consulting 
services on a similar basis. Its hard currency profits would come from sales of the joint venture's 
furniture abroad. 
Using its equipment and know-how contribution, ICL planned t o  begin manufacturing in 
Poland together with Mera. Ln the early phases, the production was t o  use licensed ICL tech- 
nology and imported components and sub-assemblies. Furnel hoped to  increasingly develop and 
produce the products in Poland, first for the domestic market and then, perhaps, for export in 
the CMEA region. 
The joint venture started operating in February, 1988, in which year, according to  Furnel 
sources, its hard currency exports amounted to  more than 12 m i 0 3  and furniture exports were 
up 8% from pre-joint venture levels. It  was predicted that  future exports would rise by 400%. 
The technology transfer involved a twin effect. The joint venture arrangement enabled the 
furniture manufacturing plants to  import badly needed advanced machinery. At the same time, 
the participating electronic firms adopted ICL technology and assembly know-how. They came 
close to world technology level and enhanced their industrial image. 
The British partner was able to  expand the production scale and increase sales and profits. 
In future years, BTC-ICL should be able to  expand not only on Polish markets but also in those 
of other CMEA member countries. 
To a large extent, Furnel owes its success to  the use of advanced management techniques, 
some of which were part of ICL's know-how contribution. The workers, numbering over 4000, 
split their earnings from finished products on a piece-work and commission basis. This is said to  
have improved quality and decreased absenteeism by 50%. The company tries to  keep wages for 
joint venture workers 30% above wages earned by those outside the venture but maintaining this 
is made difficult by Poland's wage-price inflation. Furnel'= future plans include the implementa- 
tion of more Western management techniques and, possibly, the start  of a Furnel International 
Business School using ICL's experience in management development and business training. 
Higher technology, better management skills, employee training, and motivation were as- 
sociated with this exceptional joint venture, which was concluded under rather unfavorable 
circumstances. If the partners were not inventive enough, the complex case might fail. 
Admittedly, Furnel's management has been creative in several aspects. Basically, however, 
the joint venture was an attempt to  succeed in business against such odds as credits not being 
available and zloty being nonconvertible. It can be better described as an institutionalized barter 
trade. Had the Polish wood and furniture conglomerate been able to  obtain hard currency 
financing to  fund improvements from some other source, they would not have needed a joint 
venture. Likewise, had zloty been convertible, ICL would not have had t o  join the furniture 
companies in order t o  have exportable profits. 
AVEX: A Czechoslovak Case Study 
Avex is the logo for a Dutch-Czechoslovak joint stock company for development, manufacturing, 
marketplace studies, and sales of consumer electronics. It is located in Bratislava (the capital 
of Slovakia). 
Its partners are TESLA Entertainment Electronics, Bratislava (70%), PHILIPS Gloeilamp- 
enfabrieken N.V., Eidhoven (20%) and Transakta, Prague foreign trade representation (10%). 
Other capital was backed by bank credits, in particular by the Zentralbank A.G. (Vienna). The 
joint business was registered in August 1987 (under former legal provisions on joint ventures12). 
Manufacturing activities began in November 1988 after production and auxiliary facilities had 
been rebuilt and expanded. 
The capital invested by PHILIPS Gloeilampenfabrieken N.V. was contributed mainly in- 
kind. At the time of the technology change a t  Eidhoven, the Dutch firm was about to buy 
new Japanese technology and transfer its present technology to  the plant in Bratislava. (At 
that  time, the transferred technology was still comparable to most West European plants in 
consumer electronics and unique in East European countries.) 
The management of the new joint venture bought a garment and underwear factory which was 
reconstructed, modernized, and expanded. The building facilities were adjusted to the new flow 
of manufacturing demands for transport and storage, administration and technical services: the 
production area now covers approximately 6,000 m2; the automated assembly of microprocessor 
plates for videorecorders operates in the field of 1 micron resolution; the production line is 
terminated by automated testing equipment; and the whole process is supported by an integrated 
computer control. 
The retraining of manpower proved to be rather easy. The women employees, who had 
previously sewn underwear and garments, were able to acquire new skills in a comparatively 
short time. After manufacturing commenced, PHILIPS continued to  supervise the process for 
3-4 months, after which time it recalled its production inspectors, as products were already 
reliably meeting PHILIPS quality standards. 
However, several problems persist. It is crucial for an automated assembly t o  develop ad- 
vanced logistics. Some subcontractors are not motivated to supply parts that meet high inter- 
national standards. AVEX has to  buy such parts in the West. The fulfillment of production 
capacity (some 200,000 videos/year) depends on sales of products abroad in order to procure 
the necessary assembly parts. An eccentric circulation has developed: sales and purchases are 
effectuated more outside than inside the domestic marketplace. 
AVEX is now looking for standing subcontractors on a trading basis. It was proven that 
permanent contact with part suppliers and joint innovation effort are vital for the continuity of 
the process and quality of the products. 
Both managements, at Eidhoven and in Bratislava, are quite satisfied with the results 
achieved so far and are considering expanding the joint venture in the foreseeable future. 
''Legislation amended substantially since 1989 
McDonald's in Moscow: A Soviet Case Study 
McDonald's franchises constitute a chain of approximately 11,000 fast food restaurants through- 
out the world with sales of more than 8 bio$ and profits close to  340 mio$. Recently, McDonald's 
negotiated its first Soviet affiliation in Moscow. 
The contract on the biggest joint food business venture so far was signed in 1988 between 
the Canadian McDonald's and the Directorate of the Moscow Restaurants Company. A vested 
capital of 22 mio $ was contributed by the Soviet partner, i.e., 51%, and 49% by McDonald's 
Canada. A sizable part of the Canadian share was settled in-kind (equipment, know-how, and 
consulting). 
McDonald's Moscow is an exact replica of its world counterparts, apart from size-it is by far 
the largest. It  has 800 seats, some 30 cash registers, and its 400 employees (27,000 applications 
were received) serve approximately 15,000 customers per day. The price of a hamburger is 3 
rubles, for which a 3-4 course lunch could be bought in any reputable Moscow restaurant. 
The technology transfer associated with the McDonald's franchise was effectuated by the 
western partners' insistence on a strict adherence to all current principles, rules, and codes of 
conduct practiced by McDonald's on a worldwide scale. 
Western managers, consultants, and trainers guarantee that  the exacting standards set by 
McDonald's will be met. Food is served in the same wrapper as elsewhere in the world. A 
customer entering McDonald's Moscow must receive a level of service comparable to  that  of any 
McDonald's in the West. In-company supervision and inspection is as responsible and rigid as 
a t  any affiliation abroad. 
McDonald's envisages establishing some 20 similar fast-food restaurants in Moscow and 
other Soviet cities. A factory compound covering 10,000 m2 of production surface and built for 
approximately 25 bio $ will employ 200 Soviet workers and will deliver 55 t veal, 36 t potatoes, 
90,000 1 milk, etc., per week. 
The Moscow affiliation commenced operations in February 1990. Called "beeg mek" (big 
Mac), the restaurant on Pushkin Square is enjoying an incomparable boom. 
Textile Manufacturing Transfer: A Hungarian Case Study 
The KBC Budapest joint venture betwern a leading German textile corporation and 40 Hun- 
garian shareholders (with an investment ratio of 50:50) was signed in July 1988. One year later, 
a new factory had already been built, and by November 1989, was operating on a 3-shift basis. 
The production program consists of textile printing (on viscose and cotton). A new factory 
(9800m2) with a presently planned capacity of 8 million meterslyear of material (later 12 million 
meters) or DM 60 (later 80) million/year supplies the Hungarian (and other Eastern markets) 
with its products. Profits are taxed a t  20% (an unexpected setback: initially 5 years of tax 
exemption had been promised). The estimated payback period for the capital invested (some 
DM 40 million) is 8-10 years. 
The factory is a copy of the German founding company. All the machinery is German. The 
material (in its raw state) is also German, although it is presumed that  in the foreseeable future, 
a Hungarian supplier may be found who can provide material that  conforms with the prevailing 
quality standards. Colors and other additives are likewise of German origin. 
The construction workers, most of whom are from the Eastern regions of the country and 
who were attracted by the investment boom, are relatively unskilled. On the other hand, the 
shop workers are fully comparable "if not better than those in Germany as far as their skills are 
concerned." However, they lack a high work morale and are not "cost-minded." The workers are 
paid an  average of Ft .  20,00O/month, which, while above the Hungarian average, is equivalent 
to  only about DM 630 or US$ 340 per month. The management staff are "pretty good but 
not accustomed to  taking responsibility and working fast." Permanent cost-benefit evaluation is 
"something new to them." KBC Budapest delivers mainly viscose tissues. Around 300 designs 
are deliverable in 3,000 variations. The production volume is approaching some 60 mio DL4 
(three times the capital invested). 
It was expected that  the joint business would use more domestic raw materials. However, 
the demanding technology needs a certain amount of time until domestic suppliers can adjust. 
KBC Budapest was a quickly accomplished technology transfer which made it possible to  
offer on the market an advanced and fashionable product. It is possible to  expand deliveries to  
other CMEA country markets. 
Sancella Hungary: A Hungarian Case Study 
Sancella Hungary is a technologically advanced Swedish-Hungarian joint venture that manufac- 
tures hygienic baby napkins and baby diapers ("hygienic tissues"). The Hungarotex Foreign 
Trade Co. began business relations with the Swedish Molnlycke AB Group in the early 1980s. 
Growing trade between them gradually fostered mutual understanding and trust. The idea of 
converting the trade cooperation into a joint venture came from the two sides almost simulta- 
neously. 
The Molnlycke Group has now established joint ventures in 9 countries in Europe and over- 
seas. Another joint venture in Hungary could strengthen the company's endeavors, and guar- 
antee them a leading position on the world market. 
The first steps, however, had led t o  a certain disillusionment: the consensus of both initial 
parties was not a t  first backed by Hungarian industrial and banking firms. But confidence 
returned after Hungarotex had visited Interinvest, a small but agile bank, and the Ministry of 
Finance had confirmed their positive attitude toward foreign investment in the country. After 
that ,  establishment of the joint venture began to  proceed: 
Birth of the idea, early 1984 
Search for partners, Summer 1984 
Feasibility study, September 1984 
Signing of the agreement, May 1985 
Renovation and expansion of factory and administrative facilities, May 1985 
Approval by the authorities, September 1985 
Recruitment of employees and testing of sales, September-November 1985 
Delivery of machinery, December 1985-January 1986 
Pilot production, February 1986. 
Three-shift production, September 1986. 
The timetable discloses that  the build-up of the manufacturing facilities started before official 
approval. Full operation of the factory a t  Nagykata (some 65 km eastwards of Budapest) was 
attained in one year's time. 
Sancella Hungary began operation with a capital stock of 100 mio F t ,  of which 49% came 
from the Swedish partner, a further 34% was invested by Hungarotex, and the rest was deposited 
by Interinvest. 
The Swedish contribution was carried out in kind: machinery and mostly know-how (45 mio 
F t )  and only a small part (4 mio F t  t o  cover custom duties) in cash. The Hungarian-Swedish 
company soon had t o  raise credits as a consequence of the fast growth of production. 
Up-to-date technology (hardware and know-how) was provided by the Swedish partner. Two 
highly productive machine systems made i t  possible to  raise output t o  some 1 bio Ft ,  of which 
200 mio F t  (20%) was profit. (A shortcoming was that the hard currency balance had been 
negative until 1989, since which time i t  has regained equilibrium.) The joint venture business is 
tax-exempt for the first 5 years. 
The owners share profits according to  their capital contribution. The Swedish partner is 
entitled t o  take home i ts  proportion of profit in hard currency. However, they have decided 
t o  reinvest most of i t  and put off withdrawing profits until after the business has reached full 
expansion and stability. 
N l  technology transfer was assured by transplanting the entire line of equipment from the 
Swedish plant t o  the Hungarian affiliation. The bilateral contract guarantees that  in case of 
possible termination of the cooperation, the Swedish partner's confidential know-how will be 
protected against infringement from outside parties. 
All manufacturing procedures at  Sancella Hungary closely follow Swedish standards. From 
time to time, Swedish inspectors check production discipline. Product quality is excellent. 
The hygienic character of the products puts high demands on packaging material. It took 
half a year to develop and begin manufacture of adequate packaging. 
In order for joint manufacturing to be a success, not only physical but also managerial 
infrastructure is an important prerequisite. The management system worked out by the Swedish 
and Hungarian founders called for the firm to be led by a Hungarian acting manager to whom 
the heads of marketing, manufacture, and finance are subordinate (75 staff members in total). 
Manual worker were selected mainly from local inhabitants. There were several applicants 
for each available job. The average wage is 90,000-100,000 F t  per annum, about 50% higher 
than in most Hungarian plants. Performance, quality, and efficiency are also higher. 
An intricate problem was harmonization of accountancy. The Hungarians, for instance, saw 
a cause for concern in the valorization of intellectual property. After some deliberation, the 
accountancy was adjusted. 
The marketing strategy is based on a comprehensive system of reeducation and information. 
Disposable products had previously accounted for less than 10% of the Hungarian market, and 
thus a guiding campaign for the new products had to  be launched. 
Although it was primarily the high quality of its products that allowed Sancella Hungary to  
expand, attractive marketing was also extremely helpful. The firm's television commercial was 
praised as being the best on the air. 
Recently an American company with wide experience and powerful capital resources has 
decided to  compete with Sancella on the Hungarian market. Both competitors have analyzed 
the market's capacity and have decided to compete for its enlargement. 
Italian Chemical Manufacturing in the USSR and Hungary: 
Soviet and Hungarian Case Studies 
Italian Snamprogetti s.p.a. has furthered the improvement of several industrial chemical pro- 
cesses which they are looking to commercialize in Central and Eastern Europe. The following 
case studies interpreting Snamprogetti's technology transfer and marketing methods allow us to  
compare two approaches to  a similar problem. 
The Soviet Variant 
In the early 1980s Snamprogetti s.p.a. finalized details of an alliance with the Ministry for Petro- 
chemistry of the USSR (Minnefteprom) and the Nauchno-Issledovatelskiy Institute Monomerov 
dlya Sinteticheskogo Kauchuka USSR (NIIMSK) on the Behydrogenation Technology of Isobu- 
tane t o  Isobutene. 
Although several dehydrogenation plants were already in operation in the Soviet Union 
and nearby countries, both Snamprogetti and the Soviet parties were aware that  for wider 
commercialization some targeted improvements were necessary. 
The increasing utilization of MTBE in the gasoline pool would have required an alternative 
production manufacturing process and the hydrogenation of Isobutane was the only possible 
Isobutene source for a large plant. 
In June 1981, Snamprogetti s.p.a. concluded a Cooperation Agreement with V.O. Licensin- 
torg, the Soviet foreign trade licensing company. The aim of the agreement was the exchange of 
scientific and professional information, the evaluation of process and equipment design options, 
and the improvement of catalyst formulation and industrial manufacture procedures. It was 
finalized by a feasibility study on innovations carried out at a Russian pilot plant and by the 
joint development of an improved scheme of the industrial process. 
As a result of this international cooperation, Snamprogetti was given the exclusive rights to  
market the improved technology and know-how in Western countries. 
The results were so encouraging that  both partners concluded an expansion of the agreement. 
In 1985-1987 additional laboratory tests were made a t  the Russian pilot plant in the presence 
of Italian exporters. First of all, the intensity and endurance of the catalyst were checked, and 
a t  the same time, optimization of the process was studied. Based on carefully screened results, 
patents were filed. 
Snamprogetti technicians were present during the above tests and examined the operation of 
the industrial dehydrogenation plant (designed and operated under the base process) in Togliatti 
(USSR), in order to  verify all operative data. 
The laboratory studies continued with the development of a catalyst for the propane dehy- 
drogenation. 
The affiliation between the Soviet and Italian parties proved to  be so friendly and successful 
that  in October, 1989, they signed a new agreement t o  study the dehydrogenation of other 
paraffinic hydrocarbons. The new cooperation foresees a )  the study of catalytic systems which 
have a chemical composition similar t o  the one already optimized for isobutane dehydrogenation 
and b) the study of completely new catalytic systems with a different chemical composition. 
Laboratory tests have been completed and the new catalyst will be tested a t  a Jaroslavl 
(USSR) pilot plant. 
The partners are about t o  establish a joint venture for the  industrial production of the 
catalyst and t o  build a demonstration semi-industrial plant for propane dehydrogenation. The 
main advantage of the dehydrogenation process jointly developed by the Soviet and Italian 
parties is the catalytic fluidized bed. The process scheme is very simple and therefore investment 
expenditures have been heavily reduced in comparison to  competitive processes. The improved 
manufacturing has been identified as the NIIMSK-Snamprogetti Isobutane Dehydrogenation 
Process. 
Snamprogetti is confident that  the next Soviet-Italian joint venture, Ecolita, will be the first 
in the world t o  operate using innovated methods and technology on a large scale industrial basis. 
The Hungarian Variant 
In 1980 Snamprogetti s.p.a. granted t o  the Hungarian Foreign Trade Organization Chemokom- 
plex the licensing rights for a chemical plant to  be built by Tiszai Koolajipari Vallalat (TIFO) a t  
Leninvaros, in accordance with the Italian firm's Ecofuel MTBE Technology. This plant, with 
a capacity of 30,000 MTPY, was the first in the world to  produce MTBE through steam crack- 
ing before butadiene extraction and went successfully into operation in 1982 (after overcoming 
problems caused by the high butadiene content and its possibly spontaneous polymerization). 
The alliance between Snamprogetti and the Hungarian Partners was so satisfactory that  
in 1982 Chemokomplex-TIFO and Snamprogetti agreed to  extend their cooperation and build 
a demonstrative (Reference) plant for the manufacture of high purity isobutane via MTBE 
cracking based on the innovated Snamprogetti technology. 
In order to  facilitate the implementation of the plant, Snamprogetti supplied, on a free of 
charge basis, the license, design, engineering and part of the equipment. TIFO provided plant 
sites, utilities, and some equipment, supervised the construction of the Plant, and took over its 
operation. 
As scheduled, the Leninvaros Demonstration Plant commenced operation in late 1987, and 
was the first in the world to  produce Isobutene via MTBE Cracking. 
The  performance standards were not only met but largely exceeded. In particular, the 
results of the purity of the isobutene produced was more than 99.99%, making i t  the most pure 
isobutene available, suitable not only for polymerization but also for pharmaceutical purposes. 
The cooperation of the two parties extended beyond the test-run of the plant. Snamprogetti 
and TIFO increased the capacity of the demonstration unit from the initial 500 MTPY up to  
the present 3,200 MTPY. 
Snamprogetti and TIFO will probably go ahead with the implementation of a new, larger 
isobutene plant under Snamprogetti license and could extend to  the development of other tech- 
nologies. 
In the meantime, at  Snamprogetti's request, TIFO will provide technical assistance during 
the  initial stage and testing period of other Snamprogetti isobutene licensees and will perform 
jointly with Snamprogetti in training licensees a t  its Leninvaros facilities. 
Advanced features of the innovated manufacturing process are contingent mainly on the use 
of a new breed of highly selective and active catalysts. The MTBE is separated from effluent 
gaseous hydrocarbon and then purified in order to  remove light and heavy by-products. Purified 
MTBE enters the decomposition reactor where it is decomposed into isobutene and methanol. 
High purity isobutene is recovered. 
One of the  main advantages is the absence of environment polluting substrates and emissions 
associated with conventional methods using sulphuric acid. 
This Italian-Hungarian industrial cooperation led to  the development of a world leading 
chemical manufacturing innovation and promoted both participating firms to  world industrial 
eminence. 
The Long-Range Industrial Agreement FIAT-VAZ: A Soviet 
Case Study 
In the period 1966-1972, FIAT s.p.a., the Italian leader in car production, concluded a rather 
comprehensive agreement on industrial cooperation with a new car production compound, Volzh- 
skiye Avtomobilniye Zavody (VAZ) in the USSR. 
FIAT was asked to  provide a project of plants capable of manufacturing 600,000 cars per 
year (with related repasses and repairs). 
Technical documentation for two basic models was derived from the current models FIAT 
124 and FIAT 125. The design was adjusted to the specific transport conditions and market 
demands of the country. 
The object of the technology transfer was the production of design and manufacturing meth- 
ods; the know-how for the operation of a large car producing system; the training of personnel 
from top managers to  shop operators, and the organization of post-sales services. 
The general agreement was signed in May 1966 and a detailed contract followed in March 
1967. The production of the first model, a clone of FIAT 124, started in 1970, and the second 
based on FIAT 125 in 1972. 
Prior to the agreement, FIAT'S production constituted 1,150,100 carslyear. Its still-free 
production capacity was estimated a t  300,000 carslyear. In 1972, the expanded production in 
Togliatti (the town was so-named in order to  honor the Italian/Soviet cooperation) achieved 
600,000 carslyear. 
The industrial cooperation between FIAT and VAZ is often exemplified as an effective tech- 
nology transfer. First, the models offered were meticulously redesigned to  meet the specific 
needs of the contractor, while a sizeable part of the usual design cost was saved; second, the 
manufacturing methods were prepared and tested in Italy and then transferred t o  the USSR, 
and a technology development and training center was established so that  the Soviet partner 
obtained a professional background for further creative activity and growing self-reliance. 
How does FIAT assess its gains from the international cooperation? The firm became in- 
ternational in the perspective area of the USSR and other CMEA countries; it acquired new 
experience in "ad hoc technical and organization developmentn; it was able to prepare manage- 
rial and engineering personnel for engagements abroad (some experience would be applied to  
plant design and operation in Brazil). 
The Soviet estimates prefer the fast operation of the new plants; the models manufactured 
with Italian assistance are in demand not only in the USSR but in most CMEA countries and 
have found their way to  some Western markets; managers, engineers, and workers from VAZ 
may be found in many other factories in the country. 
The increased production of the VAZ car contributed t o  a sharp growth of the "inhabi- 
tants/carn indicator. In 1964 this stood a t  250 inhabitantslcar; in 1989 the corresponding 
figure was 20. 
Not everything ran smoothly and some impacts were not envisaged. From the point of 
view of FIAT, the  contractual cooperation blocked some human resources (on the management 
level as well as on the engineering and shop floor level) beyond what had been planned. As a 
consequence, the redeployment of new models a t  Turin was obstructed and delayed. Also, FIAT 
was annoyed by an error which changed the car name from FIAT t o  LADA. 
In addition, FIAT criticizes the fact that  a)  VAZ did not increase its production capacity and 
admitted to a large unsatisfied demand and b) in the course of 20 years VAZ had not developed 
more than two new models (NIVA and SAMARA). What was missing were entrepreneurial 
managers and central capital investment. 
